Response To Section 3 Grounding For The Metaphysics Of Morals, By Immanuel Kant – Book Report/Review Example

[Due Response to Section 3 Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, by Immanuel Kant Kant has a very unique perspective on goodness. According to him, the fundamental form of goodness can only be qualified by the will itself. In his opinion, this perspective of goodness is ingrained into common sense moral thought. However, this Kantian view is greatly mistaken, in my opinion. As a matter of fact, it is the core basis on which his ethics are founded. Kant’s view on absolute goodness, for that is the type of goodness I believe he is referring to in chapter 3, is the gist of my counterargument. His view on goodness, specifically the good will, seems deeply flawed to me. First, I am a firm believer that life is full of intrinsic qualities that antecede the value of the good will. In my opinion, these qualities constitute at least the following: the quality of inspiring cognitive achievements of different kinds (including intellectual, artistic, scientific, athletic, among others); the ecological quality of flourishing ecosystems and living organisms; and the quality of freedom from pain and the flaws of physical pain. None of these qualities owe their value to being variants of the good will.
Secondly, assuming categorical imperative (the good will’s guiding principle) were really distinctly formal (as Kant’s interpretation of it requires it to be), it would, in all honesty, be totally empty (just like so many of its opponents have stated (F.H. Bradley, Hegel, and J.S. Mill et al.). It is therefore unsurprising that Kant’s own view of the categorical imperative openly includes several assumptions on the value of the objects of the concept of will. However, since he is not totally aware of depending on these assumptions about the value of the objects, such assumptions remain speculative, undefended, and unquestioned throughout. All this pushes me to believe that Kant’s freedom, will, and ethics are founded on an illusion about goodness. It is quite impossible to develop a satisfactory ethical theory without openly acknowledging that many things possess intrinsic goodness in a way that antecedes their being the variant of the good will.